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Reasonable truth 
 
Melanie Klinkner, Bournemouth University 
 
In our information society of more than 3.8 billion Internet users and almost two billion 
websites (see Internetlivestats), data have never been closer to our fingertips. Yet, we are 
increasingly lost when trying to determine whether news, information or data are ‘true’ or 
‘false’, with some political players showing blatant disregard for facticity. This poses a 
number of challenges for political agency consisting of decision-making based upon 
information. Fundamentally, it raises questions about what might be ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ in 
moral terms, but also for the legal and regulatory realm. Not all ‘wrong information’ is 
dishonest, deceiving and therefore fraudulent. Some information offered can be inadvertently 
ill-informed or inaccurate, but it can also be intentionally made up, as the New York Times 
reported when President Trump ‘invented a fact’ (Baker 2018: n.pag.). Such behaviour stands 
in opposition to the integrity, reliability and validity of the information that we ought to 
consume to be accurately informed in a well-functioning democracy. Whilst ‘mass-society’ 
thrives on sensationalism and trivia (Riemen 2018: 44 and 64), with social media and 
(tabloid) news obliging, the following question remains: how to ascertain and verify 
information enabling members of society to discern the real news from fake news.  
 
The following commentary offers some observations on the post-truth phenomenon with 
reference to political theorist Hannah Arendt. Her reflections on totalitarian regimes, the role 
of propaganda and her work on Truth and Politics offer important insights into our post-truth 
era and frame this commentary in the following way: first, post-truth politics employing fake 
news risks undermining democratic societies. With this growing use of lying, parallels with 
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Arendt’s analysis of totalitarian systems become all too obvious (Arendt [1951] 2017). 
Where totalitarian regimes flourish, human rights abuses, often on a systematic and 
widespread scale and designed to quash dissent, are likely to increase. Therefore, exposed to 
this explosion of seemingly arbitrary digital media content and news where ‘right’ and 
‘wrong’ no longer matters does beg the question ‘what kind of information society do we 
want to be?’ (Brownsword 2018: 24). This is a question contingent on societal values but also 
a potential task for regulation. With so much at stake, how can we ascertain the truth? 
Assuming that not all facts can be lied or brushed away, we look to human rights fact-finding 
to ask whether the safeguards such fact-finding mechanisms adopt might just point us in a 
viable direction. This is because human rights fact-finding is concerned with collecting and 
examining facts on human rights violations and events that are often highly contested. The 
following will begin with some observations on the nature of truth as facts and opinions, 
before venturing into the realm of verification of facts in an attempt to salvage ‘truth’. 
 
Truth of fact or facticity 
There is truth and falsehood or truth and lies. However, when it comes to factual truth, there 
tends to be one true fact but an endless possibility for the fabrication of false claims. As 
Montaigne put it:  
 
If falsehood had, like truth, but one face only, we should be upon better terms; for we 
should then take for certain the contrary to what the liar says: but the reverse of truth 
has a hundred thousand forms, and a field indefinite, without bound or limit. ([1574] 
1998: 23) 
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And this endless possibility presents opportunities, particularly in the area of politics, where 
the powerful can mould their fabrications to create a new reality, as Arendt amply explores in 
her work on totalitarianism. 
 
The loss of factual truth poses significant risks because once facts are forgotten, or indeed 
lied away, it is almost impossible to rediscover these facts. As Hannah Arendt stated, facticity 
‘is always in danger of being maneuvered out of the world not only for a time but, 
potentially, forever’ (Arendt 1967: 296), with significant consequences not just for 
individuals but for entire societies since a political agenda may emanate from the denial and 
eradication of a certain set of facts.  
 
Looking at factual truths only, the example that Arendt gives is ‘on the night of August 4, 
1914, German troops crossed the frontier of Belgium’ (1967: 301). This is a simple 
description of an event that happened. There is little room for dispute as it is well 
documented; nor is this fact difficult to grasp. Such facts will be written in history books 
unlikely to change. Others require a more sophisticated level of data and interpretation 
thereof to back up claims. For example, there exists well-documented proof that autism is not 
associated with vaccination. This issue came up in a 2015 televised Republican primary 
debate where Donald Trump claimed that ‘[a]utism has become an epidemic’ (Washington 
Post Staff 2015: n.pag.). Mr Trump was evoking fears whilst his political counterpart was 
relying on scientific studies denying a link between autism and certain vaccines with the 
electorate watching from the comfort of their homes. Scientifically ascertained information 
was confronted with a fear-evoking anecdote denying scientifically proven facts. This 
episode is in many ways symptomatic for what David Patrikarakos has described as ‘a world 
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where facts are less important than narratives, where people emote rather than debate, and 
where algorithms shape our view of the world’ (2017: 264). But what is wrong with that? 
 
Truth and opinion 
If everyone is entitled to their opinion, so should Mr Trump. Freedom of expression rights in 
a pluralist society safeguards the possibility to voice opinions (subject to certain provisos). In 
the political arena we can admire rhetoric as a way to persuade or garner political support for 
the opinions espoused. Opinions warrant an explanation since ‘no opinion is self-evident’ 
(Arendt 1967: 302); the explanation is usually grounded in fact. But to disregard facts and 
espouse opinion without reference to discernable facts can border on denial and ultimately 
deceit. Such behaviour, in the hands of the powerful, presents a danger that coincidental 
‘mere opinions’ can deliberately be turned into a fabric of consistency. This trajectory can 
result in a type of propaganda seen in totalitarian movements that  
 
conjure up a lying world of consistency which is more adequate to the needs of the 
human mind than reality itself; in which, through sheer imagination, uprooted masses 
can feel at home and are spared the never-ending shocks which real life and real 
experiences deal to human beings and their expectations. (Arendt [1951] 2017: 462) 
 
The difficulties with self-held opinion and the examination, verification or otherwise, of 
someone else’s opinion first, are that it is not always clear what the underlying facts are and 
second, even if we seek to ascertain what could be ‘facts’ through our usual (trusted) sources 
of information, we are faced with algorithm problems in relation to social media or the 
‘Google is (always) on my side’ (Sharot 2017: 18) phenomenon, where Internet searches are 
customized to user profiles. What is so interesting here is that science and technological 
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development in the digital age are enabled to undermine scientific and rational discovery of 
information and facts. Facts, usually verified by science, are easily hidden with the help of 
technology. 
 
What is to be done? 
 
Even simple facts seem notoriously difficult to ascertain and are under threat of being 
discredited. This is because to establish facts, one needs evidence, including witness accounts 
or scientific and documentary evidence as proof, all of which could have been falsified. 
Moreover, facts are prone to be politicized or opportunistically ‘spun’ for political gain. 
Truth, therefore, is seemingly a very fragile concept, especially if truth would ‘owe its 
prevalence not to its own compelling quality but to the agreement of the many, who might 
change their minds tomorrow and agree on something else’ (Arendt 1967: 304). What 
safeguards can be put in place to ensure the truth outcome is compelling and not subjected to 
misappropriation? 
 
Arendt herself identified four categories of ‘existential modes of truthtelling’ as having the 
required level of impartiality and being sufficiently detached from (mass-)society and the 
political realm: ‘the solitude of the philosopher, the isolation of the scientist and artist, the 
impartiality of the historian and the judge and the independence of the fact-finder, the witness 
and the reporter’ (Arendt 1967: 310). Crucially, whilst they can become professions in 
themselves, they are modes of human existence that are common to all. Setting aside the fact 
that in today’s day and age, independence may be increasingly questionable in a hyper-
connected world where image-making is intrinsically linked to the successful acquisition and 
maintaining of one’s profession, the impartiality of the judge and the independence of the 
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fact-finder, witness and reporter (which in today’s world comprises the NGO industry) are 
critical to the success of truth-telling. To safeguard truth-telling, institutions that function 
outside the political power realm, such as the judiciary but also universities, are necessary. 
For Arendt, truth-telling is contingent on excluding political commitment or adherence to a 
cause.  
 
Three points in particular fit the observation parameters canvassed above and will be 
discussed in turn: first, universities (where typically philosophers, scientists, historians but 
also artists can be found); second the legal realm (Arendt mentions the judiciary), although 
here the emphasis will be on the need for regulation before the independent ruling of a judge; 
and finally, human rights fact-finding, which requires that the fact-finder, witness and 
reporter be examined for the purposes of practical application. 
 
(a)  Education  
Ordinarily, universities are the place where unwelcome truths are freely discussed and where 
debate is usually encouraged and above all valued. Despite their disappointing role in 
Germany pre-World War Two, and the capacity for research to be utilized for military 
purposes, Arendt (1967) still placed faith in universities’ freedom to teach and learn. But 
critics have a damning indictment for our current state of education, particularly at the 
university level, where competition, commercialization and commodification are all that 
count. In response to Thomas Mann’s assessment that democracy was contingent on 
education, Riemen says:  
 
Education is no longer intended as a process of character formation to help people 
live in truth and create beauty, carry out justice, and convey a certain wisdom. It has 
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degenerated into an instrument for the transfer of everything useful, knowledge that is 
usable for the economy and everything you need to know to earn money. (2018: 75) 
 
This type of university education may not be sufficient if we wish to understand and ascertain 
the truth of facts. This is because purely economically driven education risks 
misunderstanding all kinds of truth: the factual ones, including those of the scientist 
(vaccination does not correlate with autism) and historian but above all the metaphysical 
ones: values underlying human behaviour, guaranteeing democracy, allowing for freedom, 
etc.  
 
The debates surrounding cuts of courses and staff at the Open University in the United 
Kingdom might be indicative for this ‘consultancy driven’ trend, whereby education and 
therefore knowledge are commodified (Rose 2018; Taylor 2018). For us to adequately 
regulate against ‘fake news’, should this be desirable, we have to understand what value-
judgements ought to guide such regulation. These values may be non-monetary driven, unless 
we interpret Trump’s act of lying for the purposes of a trade deal as economically justifiable. 
For this we require appropriate education. Understanding knowledge as merely driving 
business forward might just be missing the point. 
 
(b)  Regulation 
At the time of writing, the Malaysian government tabled and enacted the ‘Anti-Fake News 
Act 2018’ where fake news is defined as ‘any news, information, data and reports, which is 
or are wholly or partly false, whether in the form of features, visuals or audio recording or in 
any other form capable of suggesting words or ideas’ (Parliament of Malaysia 2018, part 1, 
para 2 ). Amnesty International was quick to criticize this wide-ranging approach towards 
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persons who create, publish, facilitate or do not remove fake news and that could lead to 
imprisonment. Amnesty is concerned about the implications for freedom of expression and 
the curtailing of criticism towards the government (particularly ahead of elections), stating 
‘[t]he Bill combines the worst of the cheap propaganda coming from the West and the 
repressive laws and policies in the East’ (Gomez 2018: n.pag.).  
 
Therefore, before jumping to legislation on fake news, the question has to be how we wish 
our current information society to be regulated and on what value-basis? There is a 
conundrum here: on the one hand politicians utilize fake news for their advantage in securing 
a power base, and on the other, perhaps even the same politicians can argue for stricter 
freedom of speech rights that in turn curtail dissent since the dissent may be ‘fake news’, 
although, actually, the very dissent might have sought to unmask the fake news propagated in 
the first place. Brownsword argues for a three-tiered approach to the regulatory 
responsibilities in the field of information rights. These are as follows: the regulatory 
responsibility (1) ‘for maintaining the pre-conditions for human social existence, for any kind 
of human community’ (2018: 25); (2) respecting societies’ particular fundamental values; and 
(3) to balance legitimate interests (2018: 25). The balancing of rights and interests is always 
challenging: in a pluralist society, if and how should fake news be curtailed (beyond existing 
defamation laws) and what is the role of the intermediaries (media outlets and social media)? 
This requires debate! 
 
(c)   In the meantime: Beyond facticity lies a value system 
Finally, I would like to briefly examine human rights fact-finding as Arendt’s final category 
of truthteller. This is relevant because fact-finding is often a process undertaken by 
intermediaries (between beneficiaries, governments, international organizations, etc.) that 
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draw attention to, and propagate, information about particular violations. In addition, the field 
of human rights fact-finding has subjected itself to critical analysis (from inside and outside), 
in terms of a potential elitist approach to fact-finding; the risk of reducing complexities into 
too restrictive a story; the dangers of victim-witnesses turning into ‘pawns’; democratization 
of fact-finding enabled through technologies such as crowdsourcing, social media and Big 
Data and the challenges that this brings to authenticity, verification and participation in fact-
finding (Alston and Knuckey 2016). Most aspects are applicable to fake news. 
 
There is an increasing body of literature on what methods and guidelines are necessary to 
guarantee fact-finding that would satisfy ‘truth-finding’. A 2015 UN guidance and practice 
document (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner [OHCHR] 2015) 
identified eleven principles and standards for adherence, namely, Do no harm; Independence 
(of members and staff); Impartiality; Transparency (in processes); Objectivity (in collection 
of information and facts from different sources); Confidentiality; Credibility (in delivering 
what it sets out to achieve); Visibility (to ensure awareness among authorities and those 
concerned); Integrity (treating all with decency, honesty and respect and integrity in 
methods); Professionalism (working with knowledge, diligence and competence); and 
Consistency (in the way information is examined until the process of a comprehensive 
inquiry is complete). These are hardly earth-shattering revelations but rather immediately 
evident benchmarks for any type of reporting. 
 
Other guidelines, such as the Lund-London Guidelines, wish to improve ‘the accuracy, 
objectivity, transparency and credibility of human rights fact-finding by NGOs’ (International 
Bar Association [IBA] 2009: 1). From a truth perspective particularly noteworthy is the 
section on standard of proof, stating the importance of gathering sufficient information from 
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a variety of credible sources, of assessing the reliability of the information obtained in light 
of the law, and to ‘reach conclusions to its reasonable satisfaction based on this assessment’ 
2009: 10). Consistent application of the standard of proof is important ensuring that the fact-
finders conclusions can be based on ‘reasonable belief’. Where the standard of proof has not 
been met, this needs to be indicated in the report. Similarly, if the standard of proof has been 
exceeded, this too needs to find expression in the report (2009: 1). 
 
Concluding remarks 
We have seen that post-truth facts, based on opinion or deliberate mis-representation and 
despite their seemingly random use and utterance, are generally easy to comprehend. But, with 
Arendt, they pose challenges that framed this commentary: challenges for democracy and 
human rights; questions around societal values; but also difficulties in ascertaining facts. As 
Riemen analyses (and links to the rise of fascism): ‘The greatest rancor is directed toward 
anything difficult. Whatever cannot be immediately understood by all is difficult, therefore 
elitist, therefore antidemocratic’ (2018: 49). Truth requires an acknowledgement and 
appreciation of complexities of facts that is antithetical to fake news and post-truth politics. 
Inspired by Arendt, important mechanisms such as education, regulation and legal institutions 
have been underscored as potential anti-dotes. In addition human rights fact-finding is 
highlighted since it is used to the contentiousness of facts and to questions of whether facts 
exist (Mégret 2016). It relies on values inherent to the fact-finder herself and those values are 
often contingent on education and awareness; second, there are clear attempts at regulation 
where also (scientific) methods are proffered as useful tools; and finally, fact-finding requires 
a minimum standard of proof, referring to ‘reasonableness’. The word ‘reasonable’ may have 
gone out of fashion, but at least in the context of a ‘reasonable belief’, it is pleasing to see 
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reason to be part of human action and determination. Perhaps it is simply time to rely more on 
this human faculty. 
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